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Abstract 
This paper examines the short-term signalling power of UK open market share repurchases 
between 1999 and 2004. The 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns centred on the announcement 
date are statistically significant at 1.13% and 1.21% respectively. However, there is no evidence to 
support any relationship between the 5-day announcement abnormal returns and characteristics 
of UK share repurchases, such as the percentage of shares to be repurchased, pre-announcement 
return, size and lag time. These results are largely in line with results reported by Rees (1996). It 
seems that UK share repurchases are not primarily motivated by share undervaluation. That is 
why the signalling hypothesis fails to explain the announcement abnormal returns of the UK 
open market share repurchases.   
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Short-term Returns of UK Share Buyback Activity 
 
1: Introduction 
Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981) use share repurchase data from the US to test the signalling 
hypothesis of repurchases against other explanations, like the personal taxation, leverage and 
expropriation hypotheses. They find significant increases in the share prices of the (mainly) small 
firms engaged in tender offers, within one day of the announcement. This supports the signalling 
theory, in which managers of the firm use share repurchases to bridge the information gap 
between the firm and markets. Later studies of US share repurchases generally agree with their 
results  and  the  signalling  theory  is  considered  as  the  most  plausible  explanation  for  the 
short-term abnormal returns occurring around the announcement, an average 3.0% 5-day return 
((Comment and Jarrell (1991); Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995)). In contrast, the 
cause of UK share repurchases is still an enigma.   
 
The earliest work on UK open market share repurchases is by Rees (1996), who finds a 0.25% 
5-day announcement abnormal return in the UK market from 1981 to 1990. Subsequently, Rau 
and  Vermaelen  (2002)  report  a  1.14%  abnormal  return  in  the  11  days  surrounding  the 
announcement of 264 UK share repurchases (including open market share repurchases, private 
repurchases  and  tender  offers)  between  January  1980  and June 1998.  Due  to  the  significant 
negative one-year abnormal returns (-7%) repurchasing firms earned after the announcement, 
they conclude that share repurchases in the UK market are triggered not by share undervaluation, 
but  by  the  tax  consequences  for  pension  funds,  and  thus  UK  share  repurchases  have  little 
signalling  power.  In  contrast,  the  recent  study  by  Oswald  and  Young  (2004)  for  the  period 
between January 1995 and December 2000 shows a different picture. A more comprehensive 
sample yields a 1.95% 11-day abnormal return, and significant positive one-year return (7.53%) 
following the announcement, supporting the view that UK share repurchases are influenced by 
share undervaluation.   
 
These conflicting results  inspire our study  and the purpose of this  paper is to  examine the   4
signalling  power  of  UK  open  market  share  repurchases,  identify  the  relationship  between 
short-term  abnormal  returns  and  the  characteristics  of  repurchasing  firms,  reveal  regulatory 
differences between the US and the UK market regarding open market share repurchases and 
find out how announcement returns are affected by firm size and book-to-market ratio.   
 
The market model is used for the calculation of short-term abnormal returns. To examine the 
signalling power of UK share repurchases, we hypothesise that the short-term announcement 
return of UK share repurchases should, like the US repurchases, be negatively related to the 
pre-announcement return and positively related to the percentage of shares to be repurchased. 
Moreover, the short-run CAR (cumulative abnormal return) is influenced by the firm size and 
book-to-market ratio. Finally, as the abnormal return of the UK repurchases is much lower than 
that of the US repurchases, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of announcement abnormal returns 
using Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and examine the constitution of the UK share 
repurchases and the effects of multiple announcements.     
 
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 briefly summarizes previous literature. Section 3 
describes the data resources, collection methods, and descriptive statistics of our final sample. 
Section 4 summarises the hypotheses. Section 5 considers the changes in tax law during the 
sample period. Section 6 includes methodology used, univariate results, regression results and 
sensitivity analysis of announcement abnormal returns. Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2: Literature Review   
Extensive research in the US provides plenty of theory and evidence on the motivation behind 
share  repurchases. The dominant theme  is  the  signalling  effect  of share  repurchases ((Dann 
(1981) and Vermaelen (1981) and Comment and Jarrell (1991)). Vermaelen (1981) finds that the 
pricing behaviour of repurchasing firms is consistent with the hypothesis that firms offer premia 
for their own shares mainly in order to signal positive information and that the market uses the 
premium, the size of repurchase and the fraction of insider holdings as signals in order to price 
securities around the announcement date. With a sample of 131 tender offers and 243 open 
market  share  repurchases  announced  from  1962  to  1976,  he  detects  an  average  5.25%   5
announcement abnormal return. His sample is dominated by small firms, which are mainly held 
by  insiders  who  commit  themselves  not  to  tender  their  shares.  Moreover,  tender  offers  are 
followed  by  significant  improvement  in  earnings  per  share.  Subsequently,  Dann  (1981)   
compares the signalling hypothesis with other hypotheses like personal tax savings and the wealth 
transfer  or  expropriation  hypothesis  using  a  sample  of  143  cash  tender  offers  announced 
between 1962 and 1976. The mean announcement abnormal returns on the announcement date 
and the day after the announcement date are 8.95% and 6.83% respectively, both significant at 
the 1% level and such increases of share prices are permanent following the announcement. 
Moreover, the mean portfolio daily return of the 50-day period beginning 60 days prior to the 
announcement  date  is  -0.09%.  He  further  examines  the  changes  of  senior  security  prices 
surrounding the announcement date and finds that announcement returns of these securities are 
either significantly positive or insignificantly different from zero. In addition, the announcement 
returns  of  these  securities  are  positively  related  to  the  size  of  repurchase  and  stock  price 
movements,  results  that  are  inconsistent  with  the  expropriation  hypothesis.  He  finds  some 
evidence  to  support  the  personal  tax  savings  hypothesis.  However,  the  positive  stock  price 
movement following announcements of completion of previously unannounced open market 
repurchases is contrary to the prediction of the tax savings hypothesis. Overall, his interpretation 
of the evidence is generally consistent with Vermaelen's (1981).   
 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) examine a sample of 1,239 open market share 
repurchases announced between January 1980 and December 1990 by firms whose shares traded 
on  the  NYSE,  ASE  and  NASDAQ.  They  realize  that  the  initial  share  price  movement 
surrounding the announcement is consistent with the signalling hypothesis. For example, the 
mean announcement period abnormal return is 4.51% for programmes that are for more than 
10% of outstanding shares. For those programmes that are for less than 2.5% of outstanding 
shares,  the  average  market  reaction  is  2.58%.  In  addition,  38  firms  that  announced 
undervaluation as the motive for repurchases have an average -5.52% pre-announcement return 
as well as a large mean announcement return, 5.31%. When the sample is segmented on the basis 
of firm size, firms in the two largest size deciles exhibit an abnormal return of only 2.09% while 
those in the two smallest size deciles show a highest average abnormal return of 8.19%. The   6
results of a regression model with announcement abnormal returns as the dependent variable   
and factors, like the size of repurchase, firm size, book-to-market ratio and pre-announcement 
returns as explanatory variables, show that announcement abnormal returns are positively related 
to the size of repurchase and negatively related to firm size while unrelated to book-to-market 
ratio.   
 
To  our  knowledge,  there  is  only  one  paper  examining  the  relation  between  announcement 
abnormal returns of UK open market share repurchases and related independent variables. Rees 
(1996)  uses  the  effective date  as  the  announcement date  and  considers  all  Regulatory News 
Services  (RNS)  announcements  of  share  repurchases  as  open  market  share  repurchase 
announcements. Although only 105 firms repurchased shares in the period from 1981 to 1990, 
he identifies 882 repurchase announcements and, not surprisingly, the average 5-day abnormal 
return of the sample is 0.25%, given that the average repurchase of shares is less than 0.5% of 
equity.  Though  he  finds  a  positive  relationship  between  the  announcement  return  and  the 
percentage repurchased, the regression results of the model with independent variables like log 
market value, percentage repurchased, log gearing and log liquidity show no evidence to support 
the signalling hypothesis.       
 
3: Data   
Our data is collected from various resources- the Financial Times, The FAME database, RNS 
(Hemscott),  and  Company  annual  reports  -  in  order  to  include  all  UK  open  market  share 
repurchases  announced  between  1st  January  1999  and  31st  December  2004.  We  search  all 
repurchase  announcements  published  by  the  Financial  Times  for  the  sample  period  with 
keywords  like  “share  buybacks”  and  “share  buy-back”,  excluding  repurchase  announcements 
made by close-fund investment trusts, as well as announcements of tender offers and preferred 
share repurchases. This process yields 219 open-market share announcements. As the Financial 
Times focuses on the largest firms, we use the FAME database to supplement our data search. 
FAME includes all publicly traded UK companies, and it generates 317 firms whose reported 
year-end outstanding shares decreased at least once on a yearly basis between 1999 and 2005. 
With the aid of companies’ annual reports, 162 out of 317 firms announcements are found to be   7
unrelated to open market share repurchases, while the rest of the firms announced 213 open 
market repurchases during the sample period. 36 more announcements are added to our data 
after checking RNS supplied by Hemscott, while other RNS news related to privately negotiated 
share repurchases and directors’ share trading are ignored. Finally, we have a data set composing 
of 468 open market repurchase announcements, which is far smaller than the sample size used in 
US  studies.  Rau  and  Vermaelen  (2002)  believe  that  the  UK  tax  (imputation  system)  and 
regulatory systems are to blame for the low level of repurchasing activity. However, our sample 
period is free of the UK imputation tax system, but the number of repurchase announcements 
has not risen substantially. Our sample size is in line with that (413) used by Oswald and Young 
(2004). We believe the cause of such a huge difference between the sizes of the US and UK 
samples  lies  in  the  database.  Jagannathan,  Stephens  and  Weisbach  (2000)  believe  that  the 
collection method of SDC (Securities Data Company), which gathers all firms expressing their 
intentions  of  repurchases,  inflates  the  number  of  repurchases,  and  thus  results  in  a  low 
completion  rate  of  US  share  repurchase  programmes  (Stephens  and  Weisbach  (1998)).  In 
contrast,  our  data  collection  procedure  prevents  overestimation  of  the  number  of  share 
repurchases announced. The Financial Times reports repurchase news when the firm makes an 
indication of repurchase explicitly or has already repurchased some shares in the market. All 
announcements obtained from FAME are deducted backwards. For instance, we check the firm’s 
annual report if FAME shows a decrease in the firm’s outstanding shares in the sample period. 
When the annual report reveals that the firm repurchased shares on the market in the past year, 
we then check with RNS for the announcement date or AGM date. Therefore, only 13 out of 
468 announcements were aborted without repurchasing any shares on the market before the next 
AGM date.   
 
The Financial Times and RNS provide us with the announcement and/or effective date. The 
announcement date is defined in this paper as either the first time repurchase news was published 
by  the  newspapers  and  RNS  or  the  AGM  and/or  EGM  date,  where  firms  were  granted 
repurchase  authority  by  shareholders,  while  the  effective  date  is  the  date  that  firms  first 
repurchased  shares  on  the  market  after  obtaining  authorisation  each  year.  When  the  firm 
announced more than one open market repurchase, we only account for one announcement for   8
the  firm  in  that  year  and  the  announcement  date  would  be  the  first  news  publishing  date 
following the expiration of the previous authorisation period. The information regarding the 
percentage of repurchases is usually retrieved from company annual reports or special circulars 
published on RNS. Share prices, market capitalisation and market-to-book ratio of repurchases 
firms are drawn from DataStream. 
 
Table 1 summaries the characteristics of share repurchases announced between January 1999 and 
December 2004, such as size and book-to-market ranking and the mean percentage of shares 
sought at the announcement for each year between 1999 and 2004. At the end of each June from 
1998 to 2004, all UK listed shares are collected and divided into 6 portfolios in the following 
ways. First, allocate all firms into two size groups, Small (S) and Big (B) on the basis of the FTSE 
all  Shares  Median  Cap  and  then  each  size  group  is  further  divided  into  3  roughly  equal 
book-to-market value (BTMV) portfolios, low (L), medium (M) and high (H). The breakpoints 
for size groups and BTMV portfolios at the end of each June can be identified. Then, based on 
these  breakpoints, all repurchase  firms  are allocated  into the  corresponding size and  BTMV 
portfolios on the basis of market capitalization and book-to-market ratio on the announcement.     
     
 
The average percentage of shares sought at the announcement for the sample period is 11%, 
which is similar to the 9.8% reported by Rau and Vermaelen (2002). The percentage of shares 
sought for the UK share repurchases should be considered more conservative than that of the   
US share repurchases because US firms are likely to announce the amount of cash spent on 
repurchases while UK firms are likely to announce the percentage of shares sought. Most of the 
UK firms renew authorisation for open market share repurchases every year and do not change 





 Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for open market share repurchases announced between January 1999 and December 2004 
 
The Table records the number of share repurchases announced each year during the sample period, the percent of shares sought, size groups and book-to-market 
portfolios of the firms at the announcement date. At the end of each June from 1998 to 2004, all UK listed firms are collected and divided into 6 portfolios in the 
following ways. First, allocate all firms into two size groups on the basis of the FTSE all Shares Median Cap and then each size group is further divided into 3 
roughly equal BTMV portfolios on the basis of book-to-market ratio. The breakpoints for size groups and BTMV portfolios at the end of each June can be 
identified. Then, based on these breakpoints, all repurchase firms are allocated into the corresponding size and BTMV portfolios on the basis of market 
capitalization and book-to-market ratio on the announcement.     
         
 
         
                                          Percent of shares sought                    Size groups          Book-to-market portfolios 
Year    N  Mean 
%  of 
shares 
sought 
0  to 
5% 










1999  65  10.99  6  34  16  9  29  36  6  16  10  5  6  17  2  3 
2000  74  11.62  5  35  27  7  34  40  6  15  15  5  8  19  4  2 
2001  67  11.57  5  33  26  3  38  29  4  10  14  2  9  26  1  1 
2002  96  10.76  14  42  32  8  56  40  10  13  12  8  18  29  2  4 
2003  82  10.95  6  46  26  4  33  49  21  10  16  4  11  18  0  2 
2004  84  10.41  6  49  23  3  34  50  21  10  14  7  12  14  2  4 
Total  468  11.01  45  239  150  34  224  244  68  74  81  31  64  123  11  16 
  
4: Hypotheses 
With regard to signalling theory, we test the following four hypotheses: 
 
H1:  The  short-term  announcement  returns  are  negatively  related  to  the  pre-announcement 
returns.   
A negative relationship between the announcement abnormal returns and pre-announcement 
returns exists in the US market and is considered as evidence supporting the signalling theory, 
which  identifies  share  undervaluation  as  the  main  driver of  open  market  share  repurchases. 
Vermaelen  (1981)  and  Ikenberry,  Lakonishok  and  Vermaelen  (1995)  observe  negative 
pre-announcement  returns.  If  share  undervaluation  is  the  prime  motivation  for  UK  share 
repurchases, we would expect a similar pattern with our sample. Given that the mean abnormal 
return  surrounding  the  announcement  in  existing  UK  research  is  much  lower  than  that  in 
American repurchases, it is reasonable to expect a much smaller negative pre-announcement 
mean return.   
 
H2: announcement returns are positively related to the percentage of shares firms intend to 
repurchase.   
Firms  whose  shares  are  heavily  undervalued  are  more  likely  to  announce  a  larger  share 
repurchase  programmes  than  firms  whose  shares  are  just  a  little  undervalued.  The  market 
perceives that and so reacts accordingly. Ranking open market repurchases by the percentage of 
shares sought, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) find that the larger is the share 
repurchase    programme, the higher are the mean announcement period abnormal returns. The 
abnormal return difference between announcements of more than 10% of outstanding shares 
and announcements of less than 2.5% is almost 2%. Employing UK data, Rees (1996) finds a 
positive relationship between the proportion of equity repurchased and the abnormal return on 
the transaction day.     
 
 
   11 
H3: The higher is the announcement abnormal return, the longer the firm waits to repurchase 
shares in the market.   
If the market adjusts the share price of the firm upon the share repurchase announcement date 
to, or close to the level managers expect, the firm will have no incentives to repurchase shares in 
the future. Moreover, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) suggest that managers who 
treat  share  repurchases  as  an  investment  should  start  to  repurchase  shares  after  the 
announcement  if  the  price  decreases.  A  negative  relationship  between  share  repurchase 
completion and post-announcement share price is found and recorded by Ikenberry, Lakonishok 
and Vermaelen (2000) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998). The announcement share price takes 
time to slide to the level that managers perceive as a cheap purchase, and, accordingly the higher 
the announcement abnormal return the firm earns, the longer the firm waits before starting 
repurchases,  given  that  the  stock  market  is  informationally  efficient  and  market  participants 
behave rationally. To our knowledge, we are the first to test this relationship. We are able to 
identify the first effective date of a repurchase after authorisation because repurchasing firms are 
required to notify the Stock Exchange before 12 noon the following day after repurchasing shares 
on the market.   
 
H4: The announcement abnormal return is negatively related to firm size but not related to the 
book-to-market ratio.   
Large firms are under more scrutiny from the market than are small firms, so are less likely to 
suffer severe share undervaluation. In other words, small firms are more likely to use share 
repurchases to inform the market about share undervaluation than are big firms. Likewise, value 
firms  are  more  likely  to  repurchase  shares  than  growth  firms,  partly  because  of  share 
undervaluation  and  partly  because  value  firms  tend  to  have  more  excess  cash  and  fewer 
investment opportunities than growth firms. In the United States, repurchase tender offers are 
dominated by  small firms, Vermaelen (1981) cites that as  evidence supporting  the  signalling 
hypothesis.  However,  Ikenberry,  Lakonishok  and  Vermaelen  (1995)  remark  that,  in  spite  of 
severe information asymmetry among small firms, open market share repurchases in the United 
States are dominated by big firms. Though only 179 repurchases are made in the two smallest 
size deciles, they earn a mean 8.19% 5-day abnormal return, which is 6.1% higher than that   12
earned by 406 repurchases from the two largest size deciles. It looks as if the mean abnormal 
return on the announcement in their study is mainly driven by the returns from small firms. In 
contrast, they find little difference in the mean abnormal returns between growth firms and value 
firms.   
 
5: UK regulations and tax law 
Rau and Vermaelen (2002) give a detailed record of changes in regulation and tax law between 
1988 and 1995. They forecast that share repurchases should become more popular after July 2, 
1997, when the Inland Revenue eliminated tax credits for dividends, which should have made 
pension funds indifferent between dividends and capital gains. However, we find no evidence of 
a rapid surge of share repurchases announcements in the UK following the rule change. In 
addition, the sample size of 264 share repurchases reported by Rau and Vermaelen (2002) is 
highly controversial for two reasons. First, Lasfer (2000) reports 465 UK share repurchases for 
the same time period. Second, Oswald and Young (2004) stress that the SDC for UK share 
repurchases is systematically biased towards larger transactions, and the SDC reports less than 
half  the  number  of  repurchase  intentions  in  the  Sequencer/FT  sample  of  their  study.  We 
observe that the number of open market share repurchase announcements in the UK has been 
relatively stable since 1995. Oswald and Young (2004) report 431 open market share repurchases 
between 1995 and 2000, which is comparable to our sample size of 468 for the six-year time span 
from 1999 to 2004.   
 
Another factor mentioned by Rau and Vermaelen (2002) is the existence of the ACT (Advance 
Corporation Tax) in the tax system. They only estimate how the ACT affects individual investor 
preferences for dividends, while the ACT could theoretically affect corporate payout decisions. 
Loss-making firms and some profit-making ones could not realise sufficient profits to offset the 
ACT in the specific time period (5 years), so they should always prefer share repurchases to 
dividends. For loss-making firms, dividends are paid from reserves, which have already been 
taxed, but the Inland Revenue required all dividend-paying firms, whether loss making or profit 
making, to pay ACT on dividend payments. Though profit-making firms could deduct the ACT 
from their mainstream corporation tax, loss-making firms might not be able to claim that back   13
before the 5-year time period runs out. Besides, ACT can be considered as a restraint on the 
firm’s cash flow. ACT is payable on the time frequent basis (quarterly, a-half year and yearly) of 
dividend  payouts,  while  mainstream  corporation  tax  is  payable  9  months  after  the  financial 
year-end. A study of payouts of all UK firms listed on the LSE in the 1990’s shows that 85% of 
the firms paid dividends and less than 6 percent of the firms repurchased shares (Renneboog and 
Trojanowski (2005)). That implies two things: First, loss-making firms have little impact on the 
aggregate payouts in the UK, and second, ACT is not a factor determining firms’ decisions on 
payout methods. Therefore, the abolition of ACT on 5 April 1999 should have no impact on the 
number of open market share repurchases, and our sample supports this. However, the abolition 
of ACT is still worth mentioning because we do not need to consider the tax effect in our data 
analysis. Now, the UK tax system, like the US tax system, treats share repurchases and dividends 
in the same way. 
 
The final change regarding open market share repurchases happened in December of 2003, 
when the Companies Act 1985 was amended to allow firms not to cancel repurchased shares, but 
to retain these shares in treasury, allowing them to be re-issued later or distributed to managers 
when stock options are exercised, as in the US. Fenn and Liang (2001) emphasise that employee 
stock options are the reason behind the popularity of open market share repurchases in the 
United States. Managers in the US use open market share repurchases to improve EPS (earnings 
per share) and share price, thereby raising the value of their stock options. Our study shows that 
UK managers recognised the effect of share repurchases on stock options long before December 
2003. Over 19% of our sample firms cite improvement of EPS as the reason for open market 
share  repurchases  (Panel  E  of  Table  2).  In  addition,  the  number  of  share  repurchase 
announcements in the year 2004 is only 2 announcements more than that of the year 2003, but 
12 less than 2002.   
 
After all the changes in the tax and company law system, the characteristics of UK open market 
repurchases are the same as those of the US, apart from the different tax rates for capital gains 
and dividends at the personal level in two countries. However, UK special business practices and 
company  law  make the  comparison of the UK  and the US open  market share  repurchases   14
difficult for the following reasons:   
 
1.  The difficulty in identifying the announcement date: the announcement date is the date 
when the information regarding share repurchases is first available to market participants, 
therefore, we expect to see a sudden jump in share prices on that date. US share repurchase 
announcement dates are gathered from the Wall Street Journal and defined as the date when 
a firm receives its buyback authorization. Given the possibility that the news service lags 
behind  the  event, the US studies use  a 5-day  event window to  measure announcement 
abnormal returns. A 5-day event window has proven to be efficient and there is no evidence 
of information leakage 2-day before the announcement. In contrast, it is much harder to 
determine the announcement date for UK share repurchases. This is emphasised by Rees 
(1996), who believes that there is no equivalent of the US type of announcement date under 
UK regulations. That is why he uses the effective date for the announcement return study 
and finds a 0.25% 5-day announcement abnormal return. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) analyse 
11-day  announcement  return  on  two  types  of  announcement  dates:  the  date  firms 
announced  repurchase  intentions  and  the  date  firms  completed  repurchase  plans.  That 
would create a duplication problem - the same share repurchase announcement is counted 
more than once, though at different times, in the data. Oswald and Young (2004) restrict 
their analysis of the announcement abnormal return to repurchase intentions, defined by 
Rau  and  Vermaelen  (2002)  as  the  announcement  that  the  board  has  approved  a  share 
repurchase  programme  and  will  be  seeking  approval  of  this  programme  at  the  next 
shareholders meeting. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) find no evidence of a significant market 
reaction to announcements of repurchase completions. This paper calculates announcement 
abnormal returns on two kinds of announcement dates: the date of repurchase intentions, 
as  in  Rau  and  Vermaelen  (2002),  and  the  date  of  AGM  and/  or  EGM.  When  the 
announcement date is the AGM date, information leakage is inevitable. According to the 
Companies Act 1985, a firm needs to send the AGM agenda to its shareholders at least 28 
days before the meeting. The agenda describes all the business that will be conducted at the 
meeting, including ordinary resolutions like the election of directors, and special resolutions 
such as the power to issue new shares and/or repurchase shares in the coming year.   15
2.  Compounding element of repurchase intentions news: repurchase intentions in the UK are 
always  announced  with  other  financial  news,  such  as  preliminary  final  results,  property 
disposal news, reorganisation news, and failure to complete a merger or obtain government 
approval for their plans. The AGM is partly used for updating shareholders on the trading 
performance of the firm, usually the first quarter earnings and sales. Thus, announcement 
abnormal returns are influenced not only by repurchase news but also earnings or sales 
surprises. When there is an earnings warning, the share price of the firm is likely to drop 
even with a promise of share repurchase.   
3.  Difficulty  in  calculating  the  total  value  of  share  repurchases  on  an  annual  basis:  many 
studies of US repurchases mention the trend change in payout policy and the total value in 
dollar terms for dividends and repurchases (Bagwell and Shoven (1989) and Jagannathan, 
Stephens and Weisbach (2000)). It is not feasible to get that kind of value for UK share 
repurchases. 95% of firms in our sample announced the percentage of share sought rather 
than the amount of money spent, so calculation of the value of repurchases based on that 
information will be inaccurate and should not be used for research purposes.   
4.  Repurchase  reasons:  nearly  85%  of  the  repurchase  announcements  of  Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) study gave no reasons for repurchases. In contrast, the 
reasons for repurchases can be easily collected in the UK. As required by the Companies 
Act 1985, UK repurchasing firms need to give the number and percentage of shares bought 
during the year in the Annual Report. Most of them also explain reasons for repurchases 
there, and thus, we are able to report and analyse the motivation for repurchases from the 
management’s point  of view.  Nearly 95%  of repurchasing firms give reasons  for  share 
repurchases in our sample.   
 
6: Methodology and results 
6.1 Methodology and Univariate results   
We evaluate the short-term announcement performance with the event-window methodology 
outlined  by  MacKinlay  (1997).  The  event  window  in  this  study  is  31  days  comprising  20 
pre-announcement days, the announcement day and 10 post-announcement days. Two models 
are employed for the short-term performance estimation, the constant mean return model and   16
the market model. The FTSE Non-financial Index is used to proxy the market and constants and 
coefficients  are  obtained  by  using  share  mid-prices  from  –270  day  to  –21  day  before  the 
announcement. The mean announcement abnormal returns yielded by the two models are not 
very different, 0.0034% for 5 days and 0.1307% for 31 days. Therefore, we use abnormal returns 
calculated by the market model for the rest of the analysis. The repurchase announcements are 
quite  evenly  dispersed  during  the  sample  period.  We  find  a  low  autocorrelation  in  daily 
announcement abnormal returns in this study. The autocorrelation adjustments we made in the 
t-test  had  no  material  impact  on  the  results;  therefore,  we  present  t-tests  assuming  zero 
autocorrelation. Two sets  of CARs  are measured,  -20 to  –3, -2  to +2,  and +2  to  +10 for 
comparison with the US studies, -1 to +1, -5 to +5, and –10 to +10 with the UK studies (see 
Panel A and B of Table 2). The 5-day (-2 to +2) CAR, at 1.13%, is evidently lower than the 
3.54% reported by Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) based on American data, but is 
comparable with the 1.64% measured by Lasfer (2000) using UK data. The 11-day (-5 to +5) 
CAR, 1.24%, is in line with the 1.14% and 1.95% estimated by Rau and Vermaelen (2002) and 
Oswald  and Young  (2004)  respectively.  The  21-day (-10  to +10)  CAR,  1.18%, is  not  much 
different from the 11-day CAR, 1.21%, while Oswald and Young (2004) find 2.31% 21-day CAR, 
which is much higher than our, with the UK data, though in the different period.   
 
The main difference between our CARs and the US ones lies in the pre-announcement CAR. We 
have a positive 0.89% 18-day, statistically significant at 5% level, pre-announcement CAR, while 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) find a statistically significant negative 3.07% 18-day 
pre-announcement  CAR,  which,  they  claim,  is  strong  evidence  supporting  the  signalling 
theory-share undervaluation. Lasfer (2000) finds a positive 0.23% (-40 to –3) pre-announcement 
CAR and he argues that UK firms are not able to time their repurchase announcements. Apart 
from Lasfer (2000), other studies have not compared the pre-announcement CAR in the two 
markets. We are not in agreement with his suggestion, as we believe that the divergence is caused 
by  the  requirements  of  the  UK  Companies  Act  1980  –  to  send  out  the  AGM  circular  to 
shareholders at least 28 days before the meeting. Therefore, the positive pre-announcement CAR 
is  the  effect  of  information  leakage.  Figure  1  indicates  the  CAR  movement  around  the 
announcement date. For all announcements, the 31-day CAR line shows that share prices began   17
to rise before the announcement date. The CAR lines for the years 1999, 2000, and 2003 give a   
clear indication of information leakage and the other 3 years reveal little or no evidence of 
information leakage. There is a jump in share price from day 0 to day 1 for all CAR lines, which 
means that the selection of the announcement date used in the study is effective.   
 
 
To clarify the nature of announcement returns, we summarise 5-day announcement abnormal 
returns based on the percentage of repurchase sought, the lag time and the reason stated by 
managers (see Panel C, D, and E of Table 2).   
The relationship between the percentage of shares sought and the 5-day CARs is presented in 
Panel C. The higher is the percentage of shares sought, the higher is the average 5-day CAR. The 
5-day CAR of repurchases less than 5% is statistically insignificant, while the   
Fig 1. Cumulative daily abnormal returns for UK open market share repurchases over a 31-day period surrounding the announcement 
The figure plots the 31-day cumulative abnormal returns of open market share repurchases announced each year between 1999 and 2004  
as well as on the aggregation. Announcement abnormal returns are calculated using the market model and the FTSE Non-financial Index  
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Table 2 
Announcement abnormal returns of UK open market share repurchases between January 1999 and December 2004
The table reports two sets of announcement abnormal returns (in percent) measured with the market model, -20 to -3, -2 to +2,  
and +3 to +10; -1 to +1, -5 to +5 and -10 to +10. The FTSE Non-Financial Index is used for calculation of constants and coefficients. 
Abnormal returns are summarized for all repurchase firms, by time period, the percent of shares sought, the lag time and the cited 
reason by managers. T-test results are presented in parenthesis and without consideration of autocorrelation adjustments. 
Days relative to repurchase announcement 
Panel A -20   to  -3  -2    to  +2 +3    to  +10
Time period n
1999 65 1.05 (0.853) 2.30 (3.213)*** -0.85 (-1.109)
2000 74 3.44 (2.625)** 1.53 (1.292) 1.68 (2.061)**
2001 67 -0.35 (-0.335) 0.82 (1.317) -1.08 (-1.817)*
2002 96 0.00 (0.002) 1.27 (2.059)** -0.38 (-0.718)
2003 82 2.39 (2.384)** 0.32 (0.514) 0.42 (0.921)
2004 84 -0.95 (-1.386) 0.73 (1.378) -1.20 (-3.537)***
All firms 468 0.89 (2.130)** 1.13 (3.763)*** -0.23 (-0.941)
Panel B -1  to +1 -5  to +5 -10  to +10
Time period
1999 65 2.56 (3.953)*** 2.00 (2.054)** 1.97 (1.550)
2000 74 0.77 (0.682) 3.17 (2.075)** 4.76 (2.639)***
2001 67 0.73 (1.231) 0.54 (0.598) 0.16 (0.143)
2002 96 1.59 (2.682)*** 1.35 (1.883)* 0.67 (0.649)
2003 82 0.37 (0.712) 0.48 (0.708) 0.84 (0.922)
2004 84 0.90 (1.782)* -0.02 (-0.026) -0.96 (-1.191)
All firms 468 1.13 (4.039)*** 1.21 (3.233)*** 1.18 (2.422)**
Panel C
Percent of shares sought  -20   to  -3  -2    to  +2 +3    to  +10
<= 5% 45 1.40 (1.513) 0.32 (0.304) 0.06 (0.062)
>5%, but <=10% 239 0.44 (0.780) 1.10 (3.212)*** 0.16 (0.546)
>10% 150 1.61 (2.083)** 1.40 (2.396)** -0.92 (-2.036)**
No disclosed  34 0.14 (0.071) 1.21 (0.727) -0.30 (-0.272)
Panel D
The Lag time -20   to  -3  -2    to  +2 +3    to  +10
<=10 days 129 0.80 (0.975) 0.40 (0.620) -0.12 (-0.293)
>10 <=60 days 96 0.88 (0.974) 1.36 (2.061)** -0.29 (-0.552)
>60 <360 days  176 1.43 (2.184)** 1.11 (2.876)*** -0.32 (-0.824)
360 days (no repurchases) 13 2.05 (0.967) 1.93 (1.079) -1.66 (-1.231)
Panel E 
Cited reason -20   to  -3  -2    to  +2 +3    to  +10
Cash rich  128 0.46 (0.526) 1.35 (2.336)** -0.46 (-1.031)
Share undervaluation  116 1.62 (1.851)* 1.00 (1.597) -0.25 (-0.567)
Imporvement of EPS 92 0.13 (0.151) 0.75 (1.490) 0.19 (0.362)
Capital structure change 56 0.06 (0.068) 0.81 (1.054) -0.51 (-0.699)
Company reorgnisation  30 5.40 (3.303)*** 1.20 (0.588) -0.15 (-0.103)
Pressure from shareholders 12 -0.27 (-0.174) 3.16 (1.967)* -1.81 (-2.123)*
Liquidity improvement 10 1.97 (1.352) 1.23 (0.830) 2.74 (0.977)
No stated  24 -1.07 (-0.500) 1.64 (1.326) -0.40 (-0.549)
*** statistically significant at 1% level 
** statistically significant at 5% level
* statistically significant at 10% level  19
CARs of repurchases from 5% to 10% and over 10% are statistically significant at the 1% and 
5% levels respectively. 
 
Panel D reveals the relationship between the lag time and announcement abnormal returns. The 
lag time is defined as the difference between the announcement date and the effective date. The 
effective date is gathered from RNS Hemscott, which only records current “live” firms news, 
therefore, it is impossible to find out the lag time for “dead” firms. The study of the lag time and 
CARs consists of all live firms (414) in our sample. Repurchase firms which wait for more than 
10  days  before  the  first  repurchase  generate  statistically  significant  5-day  announcement 
abnormal returns, while firms which repurchase shares within 10 days earn an insignificant 0.4% 
5-day return.   
 
Panel E reports announcement abnormal returns on the basis of the reason given by the firm. 
The  distribution  of  cash  is  the  most  popular  reason  for  repurchases  and  the  mean  5-day 
announcement abnormal return of this subgroup is a significant 1.35%. Though more than 24% 
of repurchasing firms mention that share undervaluation is the motivation for repurchases, this 
subgroup  generates  an  average  insignificant  1%  5-day  CAR.  Other  popular  reasons  are 
improvement of EPS, capital structure changes and company reorganisation, though none of 
these subgroups generates mean significant 5-day CARs. Panel E shows that UK open market 
share repurchases are motivated by a variety of reasons and share undervaluation is not the 
dominant one.   
 
6.2 Regression results 
The regression results are summarized in Table 3. With the exception of the percentage of 
shares sought of Model 4, the coefficients of the other independent variables of all models have 
the  right  sign,  though  none  of  independent  variables  has  any  explanatory  power.  Model  4 
containing the size (Log MV), book-to-market ratio (Log BTMV), and the percentage of shares 
sought  has  the  best  adjusted-R-squared,  although  none  of  the  explanatory  variables  has  a 
statistically significant coefficient. As suggested by Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), 
we add 18-day pre-announcement CAR to Model 5 in order to control of the possibility of mean     20
reversion of abnormal returns. The result is disappointing. The adjusted R-squared is not 
improved, while the t-stats for Log MV and Log BTMV are even more statistically insignificant. 
Thus, the results of that regression model are not reported here. These results show that there is 
no evidence supporting the signalling theory, which is consistent with the findings of Rees (1996). 
He  tests  the  relationship  between  announcement  returns  and  various  independent  variables, 
including log market value, percentage repurchased, log gearing and log liquidity. The regression 
results  of  his  study  show  that  the  announcement  abnormal  return  is  not  affected  by  these 
independent variables. Lasfer (2000) regresses the day 0 AR and +20 to +151 CAR on a range of 
independent variables, of which log MV is included. The results show that the Log MV has 
explanatory power for the day 0 AR, but not for CAR. The regression results in general, could 
not exclude the impact of signalling hypothesis, but do suggest that the UK open market share 
repurchases between 1999 and 2004 are not mainly influenced by share undervaluation. 
 
6.3 Sensitivity analysis of announcement abnormal returns 
Table 3 
Regression Results of the models 
The table reports regression results of four models. Model 1 and 2 regress 5-day announcement abnormal 
returns on 18-day pre-announcement cumulative returns and the percent of shares sought at the  
announcement, respectively. Model  3 regresses the lag time on 5-day announcement returns. The lag time
is defined as the time difference between the announcement date and the effective date, scaled by 360
days and then log transferred to control the boundary nature of the variable. Model 4 regresses 5-day 
announcement returns on the percent of shares sought, log size and log book-to-market ratio. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dependent variables  5-day CAR 5-day CAR The Lag Time  5-day CAR
(-2 to +2) (-2 to +2) (-2 to +2)
Constant 0.011391*** 0.006925 -2.539164*** 0.024738**
(3.93) (0.67) (-25.85) (2.20)
Percent of shares sought  0.038907 -0.079148
(0.403121) (-1.08)
5-day CAR (-2 to +2)  1.559155
(1.069193)






Adjusted R-Squared -0.001799 -0.001675 0.000029 0.002794
Number of observations 468 434 414 441
*** statistically significant at 1% level 
** statistically significant at 5% level
* statistically significant at 10% level  21
 
The average 1.15% 5-day CAR of UK share repurchases is obviously much lower than the 
average 3% 5-day CAR of US share repurchases. That leads to a question - is the average CAR 
of our sample affected by the constitution of repurchasing firms or multiple announcements? To 
examine that, we conduct a test of the robustness of the announcement CARs with respect to 
two  issues:  the  impact  of  financial  organizations  and  regulated  industry  firms  and  multiple 
announcements. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) and Oswald and Young (2004) have different views 
about whether the low 11-day CAR of the UK repurchases can be treated as abnormal return. 
Thus,  we  analyse  announcement  abnormal  return  from  another  angle,  using  the  Fama  and 
French  (1993)  three-factor model to analyse  daily announcement returns on a  calendar-time 
portfolio consisting of repurchasing firms. The intercept of three-factor model provides a test of 
the null hypothesis that the mean daily excess return on the portfolio is zero.   
 
Following  Perfect,  Peterson  and  Peterson  (1995),  we  exclude  all  repurchases  announced  by 
financial firms and regulated firms from our sample, and thereby leaving 424 announcements for 
the return analysis. The mean 5-day and 11-day announcement CARs of 424 open market share 
repurchases are 1.11% and 1.29% (both significant at the 1% level), which are 0.1% lower and 
0.16% higher than the corresponding CARs of the whole sample. Independent t-test results 
show that neither of these return differences is statistically significant. 
 
Following Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), we examine the impact of multiple 
announcements  on  announcement  abnormal  returns.  75  firms  in  our  sample  announced 
repurchases more than 3 times. If share repurchases are a part of established corporate strategy, 
consecutive repurchase announcements are unlikely to be a surprise to the market. Therefore, we 
examine whether multiple announcements somehow affect announcement CARs. We eliminate 
consecutive repurchases from the data, leaving only the first announcement and thereby reduce 
the sample to 235 announcements. The 5-day and 11-day CAR differences between this sample 
and the whole sample are positive 0.38% and 0.66% respectively, both statistically insignificant at 
any  conventional  level.  Hence,  financial  organizations,  regulated  firms  or  multiple 
announcements will not result in downward estimation of announcement CARs of the UK share   22
repurchases.   
 
To employ the three-factor model, we use daily returns (calculated by the market model) over the 
event window of all repurchase firms to build up a calendar-time portfolio on the basis of the 
announcement date. Equally-weighted daily returns of this portfolio are calculated. The returns 
of FTSE Total non-financial index are used as the market returns. After 17th May 1999 the risk 
free rate is the daily rate of UK Repo middle rate and before that daily rate of UK bank bill 
1-month rate is applied. Then daily excess returns of the calendar-time portfolio and market 
portfolio are obtained.   
 
To calculate returns for size and book-to-market factors, we use the methodology of Fama and 
French (1993). First, we form two size portfolios at the end of June each year from 1998 to 2004, 
using  all  UK  listed  firms,  based  on  the  median  market  value  of  FTSE  All  Share  Index. 
Subsequently, each of the two size portfolios is further sorted by book-to-market ratio into six 
portfolios, BH (big and high B/M), BM (big and median B/M), BL (big and low B/M), SH 
(small and high B/M), SM (small and median B/M), and SL (small and low B/E). Then, the daily 
equally-weighted returns of six portfolios are calculated between 10th December 1998 and 4th 
January 2005, the period ranging from the earliest repurchase announcement to the last one.   
 
The alpha of the regression is –0.01% daily, significant at a 1% level, so the null hypothesis of 
zero daily abnormal return is rejected. This result is debateable in several ways. First, one of the 
assumptions of the model is that there are no structural changes for the whole sample period. As 
we rebuild the size and book-to-market portfolios every year, we use the 1st July of each year 
during  the  sample  period  as  the  breakpoint  for  the  Chow  test.  The  results  reveal  that  the 
coefficients of these variables are not stable over time. Second, this methodology implies that the 
three-factor model is valid for estimation of daily excess return of calendar-time portfolio. The 
three-factor model works very well for monthly excess returns and the R-squared is consistently 
over 0.9. However, the adjusted R-squared of the model in our paper is only 0.19. Thus, the 
alpha  of  the  model  is  highly  influenced  by  some  other  unknown  factors.  Third,  the 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test shows that residuals of the model are positively autocorrelated, which   23
leads an increase in the probability of type 1 error, rejecting the null hypothesis sometimes when 
it is true. Still, the statistically negative alpha suggests that repurchase firms generate a negative 
0.3% 31-day abnormal return.   
 
6.4 The effects of firm size and book-to-market ratio on announcement abnormal returns   
 
Following Fama and French (1993), at the end of each June from 1998 to 2004 all UK listed 
shares are collected and divided into 6 portfolios. First, allocate all firms into two size groups on 
the basis of the FTSE All Shares Median Cap and then each size group is further divided into 3 
roughly equal BTMV portfolios on the basis of book-to-market ratio. The breakpoints for size 
groups and BTMV portfolios at the end of each June can be identified. Then, based on these 
breakpoints, all repurchase firms are allocated into the corresponding size and BTMV portfolios 
on the basis of market capitalization and book-to-market ratio on the announcement. Table 4 
reports announcement abnormal returns on the basis of size and book-to-market ratio for all 
repurchase firms as well as each calendar year during the sample period.   
 
From a size perspective, in two out of six years, share repurchases announced by big firms earn a 
higher return than repurchases announced by small firms. On aggregation, small firms offer a 
mean 5-day 0.4% higher return than big firms. That is very different from the result reported by 
Ikenberry,  Lakonishok  and  Vermaelen (1995).  They  find  the  abnormal return  from  the  two 
smallest size deciles earn 6.1% more than that from the two biggest size deciles. 
 
From a book-to-market perspective, BH (big firms with the highest BTMV) and SH (small firms 
with the highest BTMV) generate more 5-day abnormal returns than BL (big firms with the 
lowest BTMV) and SL (small firms with the lowest BTMV) between 1999 and 2002. Especially in 
the year 2000, BH and SH earn a 5-day 19.62% more abnormal return than BL and SL.Table 4 
Table 4 reports abnormal returns based on size and book-to-market ratio for all repurchasing firms for each calendar year of the study. At the end of each June 
from 1998 to 2004, all UK listed shares are collected and divided into 6 portfolios in the following ways. First, allocate all firms into two size groups on the basis 
of the FTSE all Shares Median Cap and then each size group is further divided into 3 roughly equal BTMV portfolios on the basis of book-to-market ratio. The 
breakpoints for size groups and BTMV portfolios at the end of each June can be identified. Then, based on these breakpoints, all repurchase firms are allocated 
into the corresponding size and BTMV portfolios on the basis of market capitalization and book-to-market ratio on the announcement.     
Panel A 
Panel A shows 5-day announcement returns of size groups and book-to-market portfolios for each calendar year of the sample period. 
 
                            Size Groups                                    Book-to-market Portfolios 
Time period  Big firms  Small firms  BL  BM  BH  SL  SM  SH 
































































































*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level     26
*** statistically significant at the 10% level 
Panel B 
Panel B reports –20 to –3, -2 to +2, +3 to +10 and –20 to +10 announcement returns for all repurchasing firms based on size and book-to-market ratio. 
Days relative to repurchase announcement 
  -20 to -3  -2 to +2  +3 to +10  -20 to +10 


































































*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** statistically significant at the 10% level  
In 2003, the reverse is true and BL and SL together bring a 5-day 3.42% more abnormal return 
than BH and SH. On aggregation, BH and SH earn a 5-day 2.88% more abnormal return than 
BL and SL. That is much higher that the mean 5-day announcement CAR difference (0.5%) 
between value stocks and glamour stocks in Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) study.   
The minimal difference in the abnormal returns between big and small firms means that the UK 
market does not respond very differently to repurchases announced by either big firms or small 
firms, which is a violation of the signalling theory. On the other hand, the UK market does take 
notice of repurchases announced by big firms with high B/M. However, lack of similar trend 
among small firms implies a low signalling power of the UK share repurchases in general during 
the sample period. That is consistent with the results of Model 4 of Table 3, of which Log 
BTMV seems more related to announcement abnormal returns than Log MV.   
 
7: Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyse the motivations of UK share repurchases announced between January 
1999 and December 2004. We find that share repurchase announcements generate statistically 
significant  1.13%  and  1.21%  mean  abnormal  returns  in  the  5-day  and  11-day  window 
surrounding the announcement. The results are consistent with announcement abnormal returns 
reported by other authors (Oswald and Young (2004); Rau and Vermaelen (2002); Lasfer (2000)), 
though is much lower than 3.5% of the US repurchases reported by (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1995)).   
 
When repurchases are grouped by the size of repurchase or the lag time, abnormal returns seem 
to react as hypotheses predict. For example, the higher the percentage of repurchase announced, 
the higher the abnormal return is. The higher the abnormal return upon the announcement, the 
longer the firm waits to start the repurchase programme. However, the regression results reveal 
no relation between announcement abnormal returns and size, book-to-market ratio, percentage 
of shares intended to repurchase or pre-announcement CARs. These results are consistent with 
Rees  (1996).  In  addition,  our  paper  reveals  that  the  UK  market  reacts  to  repurchases  very 
differently from the US market. Repurchases announced by small firms earn a fractional 5-day   28
0.4% higher announcement abnormal return than repurchases announced by big firms, while 
firms  in  highest  book-to-market  portfolios  generate  an  average  5-day  2.88%  higher 
announcement abnormal return than firms in lowest book-to-market portfolios. That is contrary 
to the results reported by Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995).   
 
To summarise, like Rees (1996), we find no evidence to contradict the signalling hypothesis, but, 
we suggest that the UK open-market share repurchases are unlikely to be mainly motivated by 
share undervaluation. Moreover, based on repurchase news, we find that the most cited reason 
for share repurchases is to distribute free cash rather than to signal share undervaluation. The 
results of this paper set the tone for our future research. As the signalling theory is unable to 
explain announcement abnormal returns, we suggest using other hypotheses, such as free cash 
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